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CHAPTER 10 
Poverty Law 
PAUL GARRITY 
§10.1. Introduction. The 1970 SuRVEY year was characterized by 
retrenchment and stagnation in many areas of endeavor, including, 
lamentably, that of poverty law. For example, those pursuing con-
stitutional arguments in public welfare litigation before the United 
States Supreme Court turned in rather poor box scores.1 One. in-
stance of legislative stagnation would be that of the Federal Housing 
and Urban Development Act of 1970,2 which effected an administra-
tive consolidation of existing HUD programs at a time when housing 
production was at its lowest ebb in two decades, and when imaginative 
solutions were required to reverse the tide. Locally, poverty law ad-
vocates achieved rather dismal results.3 This last observation can be 
illustrated by three judicial decisions covering diverse substantive 
areas, but all involving the common theme of access to the courts by 
poor people. 
§10.2. Standards for leave to file in forma pauperis: Right to 
counsel. In Coonce v. Coonce,t a domestic relations case, the Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed the probate court's denial of a libellant's mo-
tion, on the filing of a libel for divorce, for permission to proceed in 
forma pauperis. The probate judge in his report of material facts 
determined that the applicable statute did not allow for waiver of fees 
by the probate court. He found that the libellant, although a recipient 
of public assistance, was not within the meaning of "destitute" as re-
quired by the Superior Court before it grants motions to proceed in 
forma pauperis. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed and decided the 
libellant did not factually prove her eligibility to proceed in forma 
PAUL GARRITY is Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a 
Fellow in Urban Law at Harvard Law School. Professor Garrity wishes to ac-
knowledge the valuable assistance of Ronald S. Perlman, a second year student at 
Boston College Law School, in the preparation of this article. 
§10.1. 1 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 
397 U.S. 397 (1970), discussed in §10.4 infra. 
2 See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-609, 84 Stat. 
1770, amending the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq. (1964). 
3 The Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, 80 Boylston Street, Boston, publishes 
quarterly the Law Reform Newsletter, which reports pending as well as decided 
litigation and legislation in the area of poverty Jaw. 
§10.2. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 155, 255 N.E.2d 330. 
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pauperis but ruled that the probate court "has the power to grant 
such a waiver in an appropriate case."2 The Court appeared to make 
every effort to avoid establishing a definitive "destitute" test as a pre-
requisite to the probate court's action in such a case. This decision 
seems to stand for the proposition that a welfare recipient, without 
proof of additional facts relating to his or her poverty, will not be 
allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. Although the Supreme Judicial 
Court explicitly did not reach federal and state constitutional issues,3 
one wonders whether the fact that this was a civil proceeding affected 
the Court's finding in this case. The following decision might shed 
some light on this query. 
In Aiello v. Commissioner of Public Welfare,4 the Supreme Judicial 
Court reversed a decree of the Superior Court which had required 
that the legal fees of welfare recipients appealing adverse welfare 
administrative determinations be paid by the Commonwealth. The 
Supreme Judicial Court quoted from Goldberg v. Kelly,5 in which the 
United States Supreme Court stated: "We do not say that counsel must 
be provided at the pre-termination hearing, but only that the recipi-
ent must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires."6 Although 
the Supreme Court in Goldberg did not decide the issue of whether 
counsel must be provided in a case where the welfare recipient cannot 
pay for one, the Supreme Judicial Court made that determination and 
quoted with approval a Louisiana federal district court opinion 
which held that "it is elementary that the Constitution does not pro-
vide a requirement that the government provide lawyen. for litigants 
in civil matters."7 The Supreme Judicial Court concluded by observ-
ing that "[t]he law is equally applicable to all those who wish to pursue 
'avenues of appellate review.' ... This is so irrespective of the fact 
that some potential [welfare] recipients may be able to afford counsel 
and others may not."S The Court's conclusion is rhetorically logical 
but it is absurd in all other respects. An indigent defendant found 
guilty of murder and sentenced to death is furnished counsel at state 
expense in his appeal to reverse his conviction. Is the Court in Aiello 
saying that recipients, totally dependent upon, but denied, welfare 
assistance, are not to be furnished counsel when appealing such de-
nial to, say, the Superior Court?9 
2 Id. at 158, 255 N.E.2d at !1!12. 
3 See, e.g., Boddie v. State of Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968), 
aff'd, 39 U.S.L.W. 4294 (U.S. March 2, 1971). 
4 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1197, 260 N.E.2d 662. 
II 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
6 ld. at 270. 
7 McGaughy v. Gardner, !196 F. Supp. !Ill, !16 (E.D. La. 1967), cited in Aiello v. 
Commissioner of Public Welfare, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1197, 1199, 260 N.E.2d 662, 
66!1. 
81970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1197, 1199, 260 N.E.2d 662, 663. 
9 See generally Note, Right to Counsel in Public Welfare Hea1ings, 48 B.U.L. 
Rev. 468 (1968). 
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In re Garland,10 decided by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit, involved an appeal from an affirmance by the district 
court of a referee's refusal to allow a husband and wife without any 
assets to proceed in forma pauperis upon their filing of voluntary in-
dividual petitions in bankruptcy. The court advanced several cogent 
reasons for its decision and, noting that a bankruptcy discharge is a 
privilege and not a right, determined that since bankruptcy is an 
administrative rather than a litigative remedy, it would be up to 
Congress to provide for the waiver of filing fees. The court felt that 
if a debtor had no assets, he would not realistically require a dis-
charge unless (l) he really did have assets but wished to conceal them 
or (2) he expected to obtain future assets and preferred to be rid of 
creditors. However, this latter result is exactly what bankruptcy con-
templates, i.e., a "fresh start." Moreover, the assetless debtor may well 
require discharge to forestall such creditor harrassment tactics as 
successive wage attachments, dunning letters and telephone calls.n 
§10.3. Legal services. In 1970 it is again appropriate to begin this 
report and analysis of developments in the area of legal services from 
the perspective of the developers.1 It was noted last year that aggressive 
advocacy by legal services attorneys had generated political opposition. 
This year the opposition flowered in the form of a proposal by the 
director of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to decentralize 
the operations of the Legal Services Program by delegating most 
decision-making to OEO officials at the regional level. The authority 
formerly exercised by the national director of the Legal Services 
Program would be severely restricted. Legal services attorneys waged 
an intense lobbying campaign against the proposal and enlisted the 
support of the American and several state and local bar associations.2 
It was pointed out that in most cases authority would be vested in 
non-attorneys who invariably were political appointees and presumably 
would allow political considerations to interfere with attorney-client 
relationships. A typical argument advanced was that pressure would be 
applied, for example, to terminate representation of community groups 
litigating as a class to achieve such politically unpopular results as 
increased public assistance benefits. As of this time, the issue is still 
in doubt. One indication of the ultimate result was the discharge of 
the director of the Legal Services Program, a foe of decentralization, 
in the midst of the dispute.3 
In Massachusetts, a more promising development arose in the form 
10 428 F.2d ll85 (1st Cir. 1970). 
11 See generally Shaffer, Proceedings in Bankruptcy In Forma Pauperis, 69 
Colum. L. Rev. 1203 (1969). 
§10.3. 1 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §9.2. 
2 Resolution of the Council of the Boston Bar Assn. on OEO Legal Services 
Program (Dec. 3, 1970). 
3 Poverty Lawyers for Effective Advocacy (PLEA) Bulletin (Nov. 23, 1970). 
3
Garrity: Chapter 10: Poverty Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1970
220 1970 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §10.4 
of a rule of the Supreme Judicial Court. On October 1, 1970, the 
Court added General Rule 3:19, allowing attorneys engaged in legal 
services and public defender work, in certain circumstances, to practice 
prior to admission to the bar of the Commonwealth. 
§10.4. Public assistance. Cases presenting issues affecting public 
welfare recipients have been reaching the United States Supreme Court 
with increasing frequency. It could be said, though, that the period of 
constitutional litigation focusing on the substance of welfare assistance 
with results favorable to recipients, which began with Shapiro v. 
Thompson,1 is perhaps over. In the recent case of Dandridge v. 
Williams,2 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a regula-
tion of the Maryland Department of Public Welfare which imposed an 
absolute limit of $250 per month on the amount of Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments irrespective of the size 
of families and their actual needs. A three-judge federal district court 
had ruled that this regulation was in violation of the equal protection 
clause. The Supreme Court disagreed and, in construing provisions of 
the Social Security Act, determined that the Maryland regulation did 
not contravene the federal statutory requirement that aid "shall be 
furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals." The 
Court remarked that "[g]iven Maryland's finite resources, its choice is 
either to support some families adequately and others le:;s adequately, 
or not to give sufficient support to any family."3 In Rosado v. Wyman,4 
decided the same day as Dandridge, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its 
ruling, previously made in King v. Smith/• that if a conflict should 
occur between the terms of the Social Security Act and state welfare 
legislatjon or regulations, the federal law would control. However, 
the Rosado case was disappointing to those advocates of the concept of 
a "right" to public assistance.6 On this issue, the Court, by way of 
dictum, noted that "[w]hile participating States must comply with the 
terms of the federal ~egislation ... the program is basically voluntary 
... .''7 In sum, if a state accepts federal public assistance monies, it must 
play by federal welfare rules. However, there is no federal constitu-
tional or statutory requirement that states provide help to those in 
need of it. 
As to welfare disputes centering around procedural due process 
issues, the prospects are less bleak. What could be considered a land-
mark case, Goldberg v. Kel!y,s was decided this 1970 SuRvEY year. 
Although in Goldberg the Supreme Court left open for future ad-
§lo.4. 1 394 u.s. 618 (1969). 
2 397 u.s. 471 (1970). 
s Id. at 479. 
4 397 u.s. 397 (1970). 
11392 u.s. 309 (1968). 
6 See, e.g., Reic~. New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964). 
7 397 u.s. 397, 408 (1970). 
8 397 u.s. 254 (1970). ~ . ' 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1970 [1970], Art. 13
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1970/iss1/13
§10.4 POVERTY LAW 221 
judication more than it decided, its general holding that welfare 
recipients cannot be denied welfare benefits except after a full "due 
process-type" hearing is a significant precedent long sought by welfare 
rights advocates. 
Welfare litigation decided in Massachusetts can, for the most part, 
be rationalized in the context of the introductory report sketched 
above. In an Opinion of the ]ustices,D the Supreme Judicial Court 
considered the constitutionality of House Bill 336 which proposed, in 
the case of newly arrived "citizens" of Massachusetts, to limit public 
assistance payments for two years to a sum equal to the amount of 
money allowed to a recipient under the laws of his prior domicile. The 
Court rather quickly disposed of this issue on the basis of the United 
States Supreme Court's decision banning welfare residency require-
ments in Shapiro v. Thompson.lo If the bill was so obviously defective, 
one might well ask why it was proposed in the first place, and why the 
legislature eventually submitted it to the Court. The Court, which 
has not been subdued in its comments in the past as to what it con-
siders frivolity, was conspicuously silent in this case. 
In Cambridge v. Commissioner of Public Welfare,U the Supreme 
Judicial Court determined that liens acquired by municipalities which 
had extended old age assistance prior to the assumption of welfare pay-
ments by the Commonwealth in 196712 were allowably abolished by 
legislation enacted in 1969.13 The crux of the Court's decision is that 
such activity, i.e., the acquisition of liens by municipalities, is purely 
governmental and as such is subject to legislative control. The broader 
issue of whether imposition of liens is consistent with federal welfare 
legislation was not reached. This issue, which has been phrased in 
terms of whether a former welfare recipient has an obligation to repay 
for assistance previously received, is at the essence of pleadings which 
have been filed in the federal district court but which, as of this time, 
have not been ruled upon. In that case, Federici. v. Ott,14 a welfare 
recipient's lump-sum social security disability payment was attached by 
the Department of Public Welfare in order to gain reimbursement for 
public assistance payments previously granted. One issue the federal 
court will have to consider is why public welfare benefits should be 
considered differently than other governmental programs, some with 
and some without "insurance" aspects, which do not involve repayment 
by the recipient. The response to this question will obviously depend 
on how the applicable federal legislation is construed. 
Of the four decisions handed down in Massachusetts involving 
9 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 367, 257 N.E.2d 94. 
10 394 u.s. 618 (1969). 
111970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 423, 257 N.E.2d 782. 
12 G.L., c. liSA, as amended by Acts of 1967, c. 658. 
13 G.L., c. 18, §2, as amended by Acts of 1969, c. 885, §28. 
14 Civil No. 69-1101-J (D. Mass., filed Oct. 17, 1969). 
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procedural due process issues, Banner v. Smolenskitll is cle.arly the most 
significant. In that case, the petitioner, acting on behalf of a class of 
welfare clients, i.e., all recipients of AFDC in Massachusetts, attacked 
the Welfare Department's appeals procedures as being inconsistent with 
Massachusetts and federal legislation and as contravening Fourteenth 
Amendment due process guarantees. The court, while allowing the 
litigation to be brought as a class action and also recognizing several 
procedural "rights" as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and 
applicable federal and state statutes, declined to issue a~ preliminary 
injunction, noting that "[f]urther evidence of both the :need for and 
the consequences of prospective relief must be presented .... "16 In its 
discussion of one of the several procedural rights the petitioner re-
quested that it protect, the court observed that federal and state legis-
lation did not require that a welfare recipient be allowed access to "his 
entire case record." Relying on Goldberg v. KellyP the court deter-
mined that this type of right is beyond the "minimum procedural 
safeguards of rudimentary due process.''18 The court also abstained 
from applying a constitutional test to procedural rights asserted by 
the petitioners which were mandated by state law and not contained 
in federal legislation. The court retained jurisdiction pending ad-
judication of these rights in the Massachusetts courts. 
As noted previously, the Supreme Judicial Court held, in Aiello v. 
Commissioner,19 that the Commonwealth is not obligated to provide 
or to pay for counsel at welfare appeals hearings. Subsequent to the 
Aiello decision, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
Granger v. Finch,2° which announced a holding that the Social Security 
Act permits, but does not require, legal counsel at evidentiary hear-
ings. This decision reinforces a Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare regulation which specifies that. states merely have to provide 
information to claimants to help them make use of any legal services 
in the community.2t 
In Haley v. Troy,22 the Massachusetts federal district court declined 
to issue a temporary restraining order requested by welfare recipients 
who alleged that pressure had been brought to bear upon them by the 
presiding justice of a lower Massachusetts court to compel them to 
institute criminal nonsupport actions against their spouses. Although a 
final decision has not, as of this writing, been handed down in that 
lli 315 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Mass. 1970). 
10 Id. at 1081. 
17 397 u.s. 254 (1970). 
18 315 F. Supp. 1076, 1083 (D. Mass. 1970). 
19 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1197, 260 N.E.2d 662. 
20 425 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. Granger v. Richardson, 400 
u.s. 824 (1971). 
21 See generally Comment, Indigent Has "Choice" But No "Rigb.t" to Counsel 
5 Legal Aid Digest I (1970). ' 
22 Civil No. 70-61M (D. Mass., filed Jan. l!J, 1970). 
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case, the denial of the temporary restraining order is inexplicable in 
the light of the Supreme Court's affirmance per curiam of Doe v. 
Shapiro.23 This case held that the receipt of public assistance could 
not be conditioned upon an applicant's instituting criminal nonsup· 
port action against the father of her illegitimate child. 
In the final decision involving procedural due process, Harrison v. 
Department of Public Welfare,24 the issue was the legality of the de-
fendant departmet;tt's issuance of a welfare regulation without com-
pliance with the provisions of the State Administrative Procedures Act. 
This case was mooted by the department's later withdrawal .of the 
regulation but, in its rescript opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court 
referred to a former decision where it had "discussed the importance 
of careful compliance with §3 [of G.L., c. 30A] in taking departmental 
administrative action which may have the effect of a regulation."25 
This very brief decision should be considered a major victory by the 
proponents of welfare recipient participation in administrative deci-
sion-making. 
Contrasted with the events of recent years, which witnessed much 
legislative activity organizing and then reorganizing the administration 
of public assistance in Massachusetts, there were but three relevant 
bills enacted in the 1970 SuRVEY year. In what has become perennial 
legislation, the "leisure time activity allowance" of recipients of Old 
Age Assistance was again increased and, for the first time, this same 
benefit was extended to recipients of Disability Assistance.26 Pre-
dictably, recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children did 
not share in this largess. Finally, the relatives' responsibility sections 
of the public welfare laws were amended to eliminate the liability of 
parents for support of children twenty-one years of age or over except 
in the case of totally disabled children.27 
Before turning to an evaluation of surplus food legislation and liti-
gation, which logically falls within the parameters of the report as to 
public assistance, it would be worthwhile to consider briefly the im-
pact of this year's welfare law developments. Although the significant 
increases both in number of welfare recipients and in monies appro-
priated for public assistance purposes are somewhat distorted due to 
the current economic depression, the leaders of the welfare rights move-
ment have almost achieved their announced, and perhaps justified, 
goal of bankrupting the system. State and local treasuries have been 
depleted by welfare demands, and in the view of many, often at the 
expense of other legitimate priorities such as higher education and 
health. While vigilant as to the procedural rights of welfare recipients, 
23 396 u.s. 488 (1970). 
24 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1105, 260 N.E.2d 141. 
25 Id. at 1105, 260 N.E.2d at 142. 
26 Acts of 1970, c. 169, amending G.L., c. liSA, §I and G.L., c. llSD, §4. 
27 Acts of 1970, c. 343, amending G.L., c. 117, §6. 
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the Supreme Court has begun to evince a concern, albeit disguised, for 
the fiscal dilemmas of the states. The Court is certainly not unmindful 
of the impracticality of a state's privilege of withdrawing: from partic-
ipation in federal welfare programs but the import of the Dandridge 
v. Wiltiams2B and Rosado v. WyriJ,an29 cases is clear. Rosado primarily 
involved federally mandated increases in public assistance. The Court 
was very.explicit iri stating that "[a] State may ... accommodate any 
increases in its· standard by reason of 'cost-of-living' ![actors to its 
budget by reducing its level of benefits."3° In other words, if the Social 
Set;urity Act requires a 6 percerit cost-of-living increase in benefits to 
welfare recipients, a state may reduce the percentage of need it pays 
by a similar figure. One could say that the handwriting is on the wall. 
In August, 1970, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issued 
its decisions in Tucker v. Hardin31 and in Briggs v. Kerrigan.32 In the 
Tucker case, litigation was brought by residents of communities not 
having commodities· distribution programs. The gist of their com-
plaint was a denial of equal protection inasmuch as equally needy 
persons in other communities received surplus food solely because 
those other communities were willing to pay local distribution costs. 
The court held that. the program was intended to assist farmers and 
the failure of the Secretary of Agriculture to pay for local distribution 
costs was justified. In the Briggs case, petitioners pointed out that a 
city of Boston pupil participated in the benefits of the National 
School Lunch Program only if a school had kitchen facilities on the 
premises. The court determined that such a classification, though it 
resulted in some inequality, was justified in the light of the substantial 
additional expenditure to provide kitchen facilities. Although the 
federal statute requires state officials to disburse funds to individual 
schools "taking into account need and attendance," the court found 
that this mandate is addressed to cases in which the limited federal 
funds available under the statute are insufficient to satisfy all the re-
quests for aid from schools willing and able to participate. 
·Fortunately, both the Congress and the General Court came to the 
rescue. Federal legislation effective January 1, 1971, ma:kes free or re-
duced price lunches mandatory (in participating schools) for poor 
children and pays up to 75 percent of the cost of lunchroom facili-
ties.33 The Massachusetts legislation requires school lunches be made 
available in all public schools.34 Jn other legislation, the 1970 General 
Court authorized school lunches for the elderly.3o 
28 397 u.s. 471 (1970). 
29 397 u.s. 397 (1970). 
30 ld. at 149. 
31 430 F .2d 737 (1st Cir. 1970). 
32 431 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1970). 
33 School Lunch Program-Expansion, Pub. L. No. 91-248, 84 Stat. 214. 
34Acts of.J970, c. 871, §1, amending G.L., c. 15, §1G. 
35 Acts of 1970, c. 753, adding §IL to G.L., c. 15. 
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§10.5. Housing: Rent control. Last year, most of the litigation 
and legislation in this area focused on tenants' remedies. This year at-
tention has shifted, and perhaps rightly so, to measures more appro-
priately designed to respond to the low-income housing "crisis" by 
increasing its supply and by controlling its costs. 
Rent control is an obvious method of preventing the overcharging 
of tenants by rent gougers who would exploit an inadequate supply 
of housing. Rent control is viewed by opponents and proponents alike 
as a temporary regulatory measure which is to be rescinded once the 
supply of housing is equivalent to the demand. Unfortunately, history, 
at least in the case of New York City, has shown (1) that it is politically 
impossible to decontrol rents and (2) that rent control actually lessens 
the available supply of housing both by stimulating abandonment 
and also by discouraging new construction. However, rent control as 
a political issue is hard to beat. It appeals to most voters, who are 
tenants, and requires very little in appropriations. In the late 1960's, 
with general economic conditions causing a significant reduction in 
new building by private industry sources and with government failing 
to deliver on its housing promises, a residential housing supply crunch 
occurred. In Massachusetts, attention was turned to rent control. 
Late in 1969, the Supreme Judicial Court declined to pass on the 
"constitutionality" of a House bill empowering Boston, in general 
terms, to establish rent control by city ordinance,! The Justices ra-
tionalized their forbearance by pointing out that the issue involved 
was one of determining "the power of the city council" rather than 
that of the legislature. Thus the requisite "solemn occasion" was not 
triggered. The Court in its opinion noted the substantial modification 
of the "Dillon rule"2 by the Home Rule Amendments of 19663 
(quoting several sections verbatim), and pointed out that it is beyond 
municipal power to enact private or civil law governing civil relation-
ships except as an incident to an exercise of "independent municipal 
power." It then added: "The meaning of 'independent municipal 
power is unclear.' "4 The Court gratuitously alluded to what it con-
sidered several defects in the bill as presented but left open the issue 
whether municipal or state legislation was appropriate for the enact-
'ment of rent control. 
'- In June, 1970, by its decision in Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Review 
and Grievance Board of Brookline,5 the Supreme Judicial Court 
§10.5. 1 Answer of the Justices, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. ll65, 250 N.E.2d 450. 
2 In capsule, the rule states: "Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the 
existence of a power is resolved by the courts against the [municipal] corporation, 
and the power is denied." I Dillon, Municipal Corporations §237 (5th ed. 19II). 
For an analysis of the Home Rule Amendment, see 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
c. 16. 
3 Mass. Const. amend. art. 89. 
41969 Mass. Adv. Sh. l165, 1167, 250 N.E.2d 450, 453. 
5 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1031, 260 N.E.2d 200. 
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passed on the validity of municipal rent control enacted without the 
benefit of state enabling or authorizing legislation. Recall that in the 
opinion of the Justices referred to above, the issue was one of the 
constitutionality of proposed state enabling legislation. In Marshal 
House, the Court concluded that Brookline could not, on its own ini-
tiative, adopt a scheme of municipal rent control because Section 
7(5) of the Home Rule Amendments denies to cities and towns the 
power "to enact private or civil law governing civil relationships ex-
cept as an incident to an exercise of an independent municipal 
power." The Court conceded that this language was "ambiguous" but 
observed that the only independent municipal power that rent control 
would be incident to would be rent regulation: 
We conclude that it would be, in effect, a contradiction (or 
circuitous) to say that a by-law, the principal objective and conse-
quence of which is to control rent payments, is also merely inci-
dental to the exercise of an independent municipal power to con-
trol rents. We perceive no component of the general municipal 
police power, other than the regulation of rents itself, to which 
such regulation fairly could be said to be incidental.6 
Unfortunately, the language just quoted is characteristic of the entire 
decision which is less than adequate. 
First of all, rather than analyze the interrelation of the various pro-
visions of the Home Rule Amendments, the Court prefetTed to restate 
them. The first question that should have been considered by the 
Court is the extent to which the amendments repeal "Dillon's Rule." 
Sections 1 and 6 appear to go quite far in this regard. The Court re-
fers to the language of Section 6 as containing "a bmad grant of 
powers to cities and towns." Section 7 precludes municipalities from 
acting in respect to certain substantive areas, e.g., in the regulation 
of elections and the levying of taxes, and Section 8 reserves certain 
legislative powers to the General Court. The question., it seems, is 
not how much power has been granted to cities and towns but rather 
how much power remains with the General Court after the adoption 
of the Home Rule Amendments. The areas of specifically impermis-
sible municipal activity listed in Section 7 may be of some interpretive 
value. With the exception of Section 7(4) ("to dispose of park land"), 
the policy would seem to be that municipalities should not legislate 
as to matters requiring statewide uniformity of treatment. That would 
appear to be the rationale for the language of Section 7(5) where 
municipalities are denied the power "to enact privat(~ or civil law 
governing civil relationships except as an incident to an exercise of 
an independent municipal power." The verbiage, which is more 
opaque than ambiguous, could be translated to mean that unless a 
"compelling municipal interest" is, as the Court infers, a "police" 
6 Id. at 10!19-1040, 260 N .E.2d at 20'1. 
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power interest, a city or a town cannot enact civil law on its own. 
This seems to be what the Court is saying and is a very significant 
limitation of municipal home rule which the draftsmen of Section 7 
should have specifically articulated. There would be no problem if 
there were, for example, a Section 7(7) which read that municipalities 
do not have the power "to legislate as to matters requiring state-wide 
uniformity of treatment." However, there is no such Section 7(7) nor 
is there any meaningful discussion by the Court of the impact of the 
Home Rule Amendments upon Dillon's rule in Massachusetts. 
Assuming, as the Court does, that the "municipal power" of Section 
7(5) is "police power," one is hard pressed to rationalize the distinc-
tions advanced as to, on one hand, taxicab and housing inspection 
regulations, and on the other, rent control. In referring to Cambridge 
Taxi Co. v. City Manager of Cambridge,7 the Court concluded that a 
municipality's setting of rates "was incidental to the exercise of a 
clearly defined, delegated power to regulate a transportation service" 
under G.L., c. 40, §22. The Court also noted that the regulation of the 
relationship of taxi driver and customer was "temporary." The Court 
should have observed that Chapter 40 is a prototype Dillon's rule 
statute, of little relevance in an era of home rule. Without making 
this crucial distinction, the Court then pronounced that the rent 
control by-law enacted in Brookline, as contrasted with taxi regula-
tions, "at least as a matter of degree, more directly intervenes in the 
continuing landlord-tenant relationship."8 However, in its housing 
inspection example, the Court salvaged matters to some extent: 
... Doubtless, under art. 89, §6, a town possesses . . . broad 
powers to adopt by-laws for the protection of the public health, 
morals, safety, and general welfare, or a type often referred to as 
the "police" power. We assume that these broad powers would 
permit adopting a by-law requiring landlords ... to take particu-
lar precautions to protect tenants against injury from fire, badly 
lighted common passageways, and similar hazards.9 
The Court cannot be disputed on this point. Again, however, the 
Court concluded that "[s]uch by-laws, although affecting the circum-
stances of a tenancy, would do so (more clearly than in the case of the 
present by-law) as an incident to the exercising of a particular aspect 
of the police power."10 Arguably, the housing inspection analogy 
should compel a sustaining of rent control. In any event, the "more 
directly" and "more clearly" language employed by the Court is 
almost too subtle a distinction. Perhaps, however, the result in this 
7 322 Mass. 108, 76 N.E.2d 135 (1947), cited in Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Re· 
'\liew and Grievance Bd. of Brookline, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1031, 1036, 260 N.E.2d 
200, 205. 
8 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1031, 1036-1037, 260 N.E.2d 200, 205. 
9 Id. at 1039, 260 N.E.2d at 206. 
10 Ibid. 
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case is appropriate since rent control may be a matter for statewide 
legislation. 
Three rent control bills were in fact enacted a few months after the 
decision in Marshal House. One is a general enabling litatute appli-
cable to all cities and towns with a population of 50,000 o:r more which 
opt to accept itll and the other two are specifically applicable to 
Boston12 and Brookline13 respectively. Before noting the specific provi-
sions of these items of legislation, it is necessary to consider their 
general significance with respect to the Home Rule Amendments. 
Chapter 842, the general enabling statute, is in effect a. local option 
law applicable to all cities and a specified class of towns which accept 
it. Chapter 843, applicable to Brookline, and Chapter 863, applicable 
to Boston, are specific delegations by the General Court to these cities 
of the power to adopt municipal rent control. Section 8 of the Home 
Rule Amendment reserves to the General Court "the power to act in 
relation to cities and towns, but only by general laws which apply 
alike to all cities, or to all cities and towns, or to a class of not fewer 
than two . . . ." Chapter 842 applies to all cities and to a class of 
towns, presumably not fewer than two, but at the option of the 
particular city and town. The second paragraph of Section 8 specifi-
cally allows the General Court to furnish options to cities and towns 
to adopt a particular mode of municipal government. Does this by 
implication preclude the general local option laws such as Chapter 
842? Put another way, Chapter 842 is not directly applicable to any 
town since it is optional, and is not an option to adopt a particular 
form of government. The General Court can delegate to cities and 
towns powers denied to them under Section 7 (Limitations on Local 
Powers), including Section 7(5), but such a delegation must be "in 
conformity ... with §8." 
Chapters 843 and 863 are laws which apply to specifically desig-
nated municipalities, and Section 8 of the Home Rule Amendments 
allows the General Court to act in relation to cities and towns "by 
special laws enacted (1) on petition filed or approved hy the voters of 
a city or town ... ; (2) by a two-thirds vote of each branch of the 
general court following a recommendation by the governor .... "Chap-
ters 843 and 863 are "special laws" but were they adopted as per 
Section 8? 
Chapter 842 contains a comprehensive scheme of municipal rent 
control which is currently being scrutinized by the Supreme Judicial 
Court. Chapters 843 and 863 are somewhat less inclusive. To analyze 
the various provisions of these three items of legislation is beyond the 
scope of this report and merits separate treatment. However, it should 
be noted that Chapter 842 contains several alternatives among which 
11 Acts of 1970, c. 842. 
12 ld., c. 863. 
13 Id., c. 843. 
' I 
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a municipality may choose. Moreover, Chapters 843 and 863 contain 
provisions which differ from those included in Chapter 842. If the 
rationale of Marshal House is that rent control requires statewide 
uniformity, what impact does this have in the disparate approaches 
and options of Chapters 842, 843 and 863? Is this the ultimate incon-
sistency inevitable from that decision? 
§10.6. Landlord and tenant. In May, 1970, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in ]avins v. 
First National Realty Corp.,l issued an opinion which altered, for that 
jurisdiction, the traditional underpinnings of the law of landlord and 
tenant. The court decided that a warranty of habitability was implied, 
by operation of law, in leases of urban dwelling units which are cov-
ered by the District's housing code and that a violation of this war-
ranty gives rise to the typical remedies for breach of contract. More 
specifically, as held by the court, a tenant's obligation to pay rent is 
dependent upon the landlord's performance of his obligations, in-
cluding a warranty that he maintain the premises in a habitable condi-
tion. In Massachusetts, a similar result was sought by legislation which 
failed to pass the General Court.2 
Much of the reported landlord-tenant litigation in Massachusetts 
in the 1970 SuRvEY year was adjudicated in federal courts and revolved 
around efforts by tenants to establish certain procedural responsibili-
ties of landlords of governmentally subsidized housing. In Hahn v. 
Gottlieb,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held 
that tenants in privately owned low-income housing which was 
financed by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) were neither con-
stitutionally nor by the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act 
entitled to an administrative hearing before the FHA on their land-
lord's proposals to that agency for rental increases. The court further 
decided that FHA approval of requested rent changes is not subject 
to judicial review. In its response to the tenants' due process claims 
the court applied what it termed a "constitutionally relevant" test. 
The court observed that a "trial type hearing" would discourage 
private investors and that a particular "[rent] increase may be small, 
and rent supplement programs are available to those in greatest 
need."4 Concluding its opinion, the court noted that "the govern-
ment interest in a summary procedure for approving rent increases 
outweighs the tenants' interest in greater procedural safeguards."5 
Parenthetically, the FHA passes on all proposed rent increases re-
quested by landlords and, in language second-guessing the capabilities 
of low-income tenants, the court remarked that "tenants are unlikely 
§10.6. 1 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
2 Senate Bill 1172; House Bill 2265. 
s 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970). 
4 Id at 1247. 
5 Id. at 1249. 
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to have special familiarity with their landlord's financial conditio;n, 
the intricacies of project management, or the state of the economy m 
the surrounding area."6 In denying judicial review of rent increases 
allowed by the FHA, the court assigned the following reasons: (1) 
"[C]ourts are ill-equipped to superintend economic and managerial 
decisions of the kind involved here" and (2) "less participation by 
private investors"7 would result. 
In McQueen v. Druker,s also involving tenants of FHA subsidized 
22l(d)(3) housing, the federal district court decided that private land-
lords who had received financial assistance from the federal govern-
ment could not evict tenants without furnishing to them a notice 
specifying "good cause" for termination of their tenancies. The Court 
also ruled that provisions in leases giving landlords power to terminate 
without cause on the expiration of a fixed term are invalid. The 
opinion alluded to cases where it had been held that a tenant of public 
housing, as opposed to subsidized housing (as in this situation), could 
be evicted only for good cause and after informative notice of that 
cause.9 The court, in its analysis of the public housing cases, seemed 
to apply the constitutional relevancy test utilized in Hahn10 and ob-
served that "on the whole, the disadvantages the government will 
suffer from being required to allege good cause for eviction are not to 
be compared with the disadvantages that a tenant will suffer if he 
is evicted capriciously."11 The court went on to determine that 
"[a]ll the arguments which favored imposing the obligation of a good-
cause notice in the case of a governmental landlord apply to a §221 
(d)(3) landlord."12 The decision did not directly refer to the factor of 
the discouragement of private investors relied upon in Hahn, but 
noted that "(t]he §22I(d)(3) landlord chose to enter into a project he 
knew was primarily for the tenants' benefit and in which he would 
be closely regulated."la 
In the final landlord-tenant case decided in the federal courts, 
Fosdick v. Dunwoody,14 the court of appeals had before it a situation 
where a tenants' group had been sued in the Massachusetts Superior 
Court by a landlord for interference with his contractual relations 
with some of his other tenants. The tenants countered by alleging that 
they were sued by the landlord in retaliation for reporting alleged 
housing code violations to housing code enforcement authorities. The 
tenants' group removed the action to the federal district court where 
6 Id. at 1248. 
7 Id. at 1249, 1250. 
8 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970). 
9 Id. at 1128-1129. 
10 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970). 
11 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (D. Mass. 1970). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 420 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1970). 
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the landlord's motion to remand was granted. The court of appeals 
affirmed, holding that the tenants' group had no standing to remove 
under the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §1443 (1964). Strangely, 
in McQueen v. DrukerP decided eight months later, the district court 
enjoined a threatened state court proceeding to evict the tenants 
because of their organizational efforts on behalf of other tenants. 
In reported litigation decided in the courts of the Commonwealth, 
the Supreme Judicial Court, in Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination v. Franzarofi/6 held, on the facts of the case, that the 
Superior Court improperly disregarded an award of damages by the 
commission which had been supported by substantial evidence. The 
Supreme Judicial Court also decided that an award by the commission 
of damages for mental suffering was not improper due to "the recogni-
tion in our cases that damages for mental suffering may be awarded in 
appropriate cases .... "17 In another decision, surprisingly one of first 
impression, the Supreme Judicial Court held that under Chapter 186 
of the General Laws, the delivery of notice to quit at a tenant's last 
and usual place of residence did not constitute presumptive evidence 
that the tenant had actual notice as required by Section 12 of that 
statute.1s 
The General Court enacted three items of legislation having con-
siderable importance to low-income tenants. First, the current six-
month discretionary stay of judgment and execution in actions of 
summary process, which was to expire this year, was extended to 
1972.19 Second, the 1969 statute prohibiting security deposits in excess 
of two months' rent was amended to respond to the abuse of the un-
scrupulous landlord who makes a practice of retaining security de-
posits.20 Under the amended statute, a landlord holding a security 
deposit in excess of one year must pay interest to the tenant at the 
end of the following year at the rate of 5 percent. The amendment, 
however, is unclear as to whether a landlord can avoid the operation 
of the statute by a succession of one-year leases. The amendment also 
provides that within 30 days after a lease or tenancy is terminated, the 
landlord must return the security deposit less damages to the premises. 
If the landlord "wilfully" fails to so return the security deposit, the 
tenant has a claim for double damages. Unfortunately, very few 
tenants, in view of the amounts involved, have either time or in-
clination to pursue this remedy, unless perhaps- and this is not clear 
-such litigation could be brought in Small Claims Court. Also, if a 
claim is brought in the Small Claims Court and the amount of deposit 
15 317 F. Supp. ll22 (D. Mass. 1970). 
16 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 343, 256 N.E.2d 311. 
17 Id. at 346, 256 N.E.2d at 313. 
18 Ryan v. Sylvester, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1117, 260 N.E.2d 148. 
19 Acts of 1970, c. 203. 
20 Id., c. 666, amending G.L., c. 186, §15B. 
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withheld is below the amount of that court's jurisdictional limits but 
above it when doubled, could the court award the latter amount? 
The last piece of landlord-tenant legislation was an amendment to 
the Commonwealth's statutory rent-withholding scheme21 by bestowing 
upon district courts original jurisdiction in rent receivership cases and 
"equity powers only to the extent necessary."22 However, the legislature 
did not appropriate monies to the revolving fund authorized in 1965 
which is required to make most receiverships work. By way of ex-
planation, those rents withheld, at least at the beginning, are. usually 
insufficient to effect immediately necessary repairs and most tenants 
must relocate before enough monies accumulate to, for example, repair 
or replace a faulty furnace. This is indeed regrettable since the 
primary legislative purpose of the scheme is thereby frustrated .. 
§10.7. Publicly subsidized housing. In 1969 the General Court 
recodified and revised the Commonwealth's housing and urban renewal 
laws. The 1970 housing legislation, while not as comprehensive as that 
of the previous year, was in many respects equally, if not more, sig-
nificant. Certain. housing programs were added and others revised, 
increased funding was authorized, and specific benefits were granted 
to elderly occupants of public housing. The most important legis-
lation involved a tenfold increase in the bonding authorization of 
the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency from $50 million to $500 
million.1 
As to new programs, the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency 
(MHF A) was authorized to commence a home ownership program for 
low-income families2 and also to finance the construction and rehabili-
tation of cooperatively owned and condominium developments.s The 
idea for these two programs was obviously borrowed from similar 
recently enacted federal legislation. The home ownership program 
allows eligible families to purchase one-, two- and three-family res-
idences. It should be noted, however, that welfare regulations signifi-
cantly restrict recipient ownership of income-producing property and 
also impede the obtaining of mortgage financing even in the case of 
single-family dwellings. It is hoped that the MHFA will resolve these 
problems, since welfare recipients would and should constitute a large 
portion of the likely beneficiaries of both of the new programs. 
The home ownership program restricts the number of low-income 
families eligible for its benefits to "one per cent of the total number 
21 G.L., c. lll, §§127A-127K. The purpose of these sections is "to apply proper 
health and safety standards reasonably for the protection of the public in the pre-
vention of violations, rather than ... to punish past violations as criminal offenses." 
Commonwealth v. Hadley, 351 Mass. 439, 442, 222 N.E.2d 681, 682· (1966). 
22 Acts of 1970, c. 852, adding §19C to G.L., c. 218. · 
§10.7. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 855, §9. 
2 Id. §2. 
3 Ibid. 
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of families resident in a city or a town" and requires the MHFA to 
make a finding, apparently in all cases, that there will not be created 
"an undue concentration of low income families in any one neighbor-
hood." This latter requirement, if strictly enforced, might preclude 
the home ownership program fro111 ever getting off the ground. This 
conclusion is compelled when one considers that this program is 
restricted to low-income families; assumes an MHFA mandated ceiling 
on the costs of the housing such families will be allowed to purchase; 
and lastly recognizes the economic realities of the current housing 
market. 
Both the home ownership and cooperative and condominium pro-
grams allow to eligible families a subsidy equal to the difference be-
tween ownership expenses (including amortization, interest, taxes, 
insurance and maintenance) and 25 percent of the family's annual 
income as defined by MHFA. The cooperative and condominium pro-
gram presupposes ownership of a number of units by other than low-
income families in a development subsidized by MHFA. This skewing 
of occupancy was sustained as to multi-unit rental developments in 
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency v. New England Merchants 
National Bank of Boston.4 The MHFA is now required by a further 
amendment to its enabling legislation to make certain findings, ap-
parently extrapolated from that decision, "prior to any loan commit-
ment."5 These findings are applicable to home ownership as well as 
rental development loans extended by MHFA. 
As part of this same legislation, the General Court also authorized 
the MHFA to operate an interest subsidy program similar to the 
interest reduction program carried out under Section 236 of the Na-
tional Housing Act.6 In both cases, there is a subsidy paid by the 
government agency amounting to the difference between the 
mortgagor's interest payments and I percent. The effect of this sub-
sidy is to reduce significantly the rentals paid by an eligible tenant. 
The MHFA enabling legislation was further amended in several 
aspects. The MHFA may now loan a nonprofit sponsor 100 percent 
of a development project's costs.7 In rental projects financed by the 
MHFA, tenants selected for occupancy may have an annual income not 
in excess of six (formerly five) times the amount of the annual rental 
designated for an apartment.8 Also, a tenant's rent will not be in-
creased until his annual income is in excess of seven (formerly six) 
times the designated annual rental.9 
Chapter 121B, the Commonwealth's omnibus housing legislation, 
was also significantly programatically amended. Cities and towns are 
4 356 Mass. 202, 249 N.E.2d 599 (1969). 
5 Acts of 1970, c. 855, §2(t). 
6 Id. §10. 
71d. §4. 
s Id. §7. 
91d. §8. 
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now authorized to enter into agreements establishing regional housing 
authorities.lo This makes sense especially in the case of municipalities 
which on their own could not "tool up" to take advantage of state 
housing programs. The provisions of Chapter 121B relating to the 
Commonwealth's leased housing program were also revised. The 
permissible percentage of units in a dwelling or develoJPment that a 
local public housing authority is allowed to lease wa> increased.n 
Housing authorities are now specifically allowed, and in fact required 
to do so within 30 days if so requested, to lease a dwellling unit oc-
cupied by an eligible tenant, assuming the rent is reasonable and the 
landlord in agreement.12 The housing authority "shall make applica-
tion" for the necessary funds, including monies now available for 
"negotiating leases," to the department of community affairs. Also, 
local authorities which were unwilling or slow to participate in the 
leased housing program have been prodded. Finally, a residency pref-
erence was written into the leased housing program requi[ring that res-
idents of the Commonwealth be given priority in the selection of 
leased housing tenants.13 Along these lines, Section 32 of Chapter l2IB, 
which contains requirements pertaining to the general operations and 
administration of public housing, was amended by the insertion of an 
antiresidency requirement provision: "No inhabitant of the city or 
town ... in which the project is located shall be refused 'eligibility ... 
solely upon the grounds of a residency prerequisite." Section 32 retained 
a residency preference worded almost identically to the one added to 
the leased housing provisions. 
The final programatic addition to the CommonweaJth's housing 
efforts involved a redesignation of legislation dealing with housing for 
the elderly to "housing for the elderly and the handicapped.''14 The 
only modification of substance was an assignment of 5 percent of newly 
constructed units for "elderly persons of low income" to "handi-
capped persons of low income.'' 
The General Court in two instances authorized increased funding 
for public housing in response to current inflationary conditions. In 
May the Commonwealth's annual contribution to public housing 
projects for the elderly was increased.l0 In August this additional 
annual contribution was further supplemented16 and also extended to 
veterans and to families occupying low-income publ!ic housing.l7 
Paralleling similar appropriations at the federal level for federally 
assisted public housing, the legislature authorized funding for the 
10 Acts of 1970, c. 851, adding §3A to G.L., c. 121B. 
11 Acts of 1970, c. 854, §1, amending G.L., c. 121B, §43. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Acts of 1970, c. 854, §2, amending G.L., c. 121B, §44. 
14 Acts of 1970, c. 812, amending G.L., c. 121B. 
1o Acts of 1970, c. 359, §5, amending G.L., c. 121B, §41. 
16 Acts of 1970, c. 695, §2, amending G.L., c. 121B, §41. 
17 Acts of 1970, c. 695, §1, amending G.L., c. 121B, §34. 
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modernization and rehabilitation of state-subsidized public housing.1s 
One might ask whether the General Court will be continually com-
pelled to intervene fiscally vis-a-vis public housing. As financing and 
operating costs continue to spiral upwards, especially the operating 
costs of older and aging developments, and as receipts to local housing 
authorities from their low-income constituencies remain relatively 
constant, further funding seems inevitable. The remaining two items 
of housing legislation to be considered further emphasize the need for 
additional funding. As to projects constructed after January I, 1971, 
local housing authorities must furnish "central common rooms, and 
central cooking facilities" in housing for the elderly poor.19 It could 
also be suggested that gymnasiums be provided in future public 
housing occupied by low-income families. The crucial question must 
direct itself to the effect such requirements have on the feasibility of 
public housing. 
In other legislation, the General Court imposed a ceiling of 20 
percent of income (25 percent if the rent includes utilities) on the rent 
to be paid by the elderly poor occupying public housing units.2° The 
Commonwealth 'is responsible for the balance necessary to meet the 
rental charge. This statute is similar to recent federal legislation ap-
plying to all federally subsidized public housing. (This federal 
legislation was proposed by Massachusetts Senator Edward Brooke.) 
The only occupants .of public housing currently unaffected by such 
ceiiings on income provisions are nonelderly occupants of state-sub-
sidized public housing. 
§10.8. Economic development. The preamble to Chapter 848, one 
of the last bills enacted during the 1970 legislative session, is as good an 
articulation of the methods of economic development as has been 
devised: "An Act establishing an urban job incentive bureau in the 
department of community affairs to develop manpower training and 
assistance programs, neutralize urban tax barriers and encourage 
industrial development and job potential in depressed areas." Under 
this legislation, specified business corporations, domestic or foreign, 
are allowed state corporation tax credits and deductions for new busi-
ness activity in eligible areas and for employing and training residents 
of these areas. Administratively, an Urban Job Incentive Bureau was 
established to organize, develop and coordinate this program.1 
· As to the details of this legislation, the bureau first determines and 
design<J.tes "eligible sections of substantial poverty" presumably in 
accordance with the standards outlined in the definitional portion of 
the act.2 The bureau would then, upon application, certify a business 
18 Acts of 1970, c. 694, amending G.L., c. 121B, §26(i), and adding §26(j). 
19 Acts of 1970, c. 740, amending G.L., c. 121 B, §40(c). 
20 Acts of 1970, c. 853, amending G.L., c. 121B, §40(e). 
§10.8. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 848, §I, adding §§ll-15 to G.L., c. 23B. 
2 Id. §ll(a). 
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facility as "eligible." To be "eligible," a business facility must have 
an impact on an area larger than the "eligible section, of substantial 
poverty" which it serves; must be engaged primarily in manu-
facturing and wholesaling activity; and must draw 20 percent (includ-
ing not less than five employees) of its work force from the "eligible 
section" where it is located.3 The act further requires that 
... The facility, except where a corporation is displaced by 
a public land taking or purchase, shall not be a replacement of 
an existing place of business or expansion thereof. It shall be a 
new place of business, separate and apart from its oth1~r facilities 
and represent expanded activities of the corporation.4 
What this ambiguous language seems to require is that to be eligible 
the business expansion activity must be housed in new quarters rather 
than be a distinctly different type of venture. 
Assuming an eligible business facility operating in an eligible section 
of substantial poverty, the jobs provided must be "meaningful." Thus, 
it is mandatory that 
... the corporation ... provides an approved training ... pro-
gram which prepares residents ... for jobs created ... and which 
assures such residents opportunities for job upgrading and for 
entry into supervisory positions .... 11 
Once all of these requirements are met, the eligible facility, for up to 
ten years, is awarded the following two tax incentives: 
(1) To the extent real property is owned by the business facility, 
a credit against the state corporation excise based upon that portion 
of the firm's real property tax bill which is in excess of the average 
property tax rate state-wide.6 
(2) A deduction in arriving at net income in the amount of 25 
percent of the compensation paid to employed residents.7 
Assuming that the subsidies involved are sufficiently large to con-
stitute a realistic incentive, the question is whether the administration 
and paperwork required of a participating firm will cancel out the 
benefits from the subsidies. Only time will tell on this issue. The act is 
quite specific in requiring "new" business effort for a firm to establish 
its eligibility. Under current actual conditions the prob~em is one of 
manufacturing and wholesaling businesses relocating from rather than 
stagnating in depressed areas. Perhaps a subsidy, compensating for 
the increased costs of operating in such areas, should b1~ extended to 
these businesses to keep them there. 
3 Id. §18. 
4 Id. §18(4). 
II ld. §18(8). 
6 Acts of 1970, c. 848, §2, adding §88E(b) to G.L., c. 63. 
7 Ibid. 
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In a second and final matter of economic development interest, the 
General Court by special law "chartered" the Greater Lowell Business 
Development Corporation.8 Among the more noteworthy provisions 
of this legislation are the corporation's purposes, i.e., among other 
things, to solicit, encourage and induce business organizations to locate 
in Greater Lowell; its nonliability for state income taxes; and its 
exemption, for ten years, from local property taxes. 
s Acts of 1970, c. 777. 
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